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The Effect of Earnings Quality and Country-level Institutions on the Value
Relevance of Earnings
Steven F. Cahan, David Emanuel, and Jerry Sun. 2009. Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, 33(4), 371-391. Post-print
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Introduction

A large body of prior research documents that the association between stock returns and
accounting earnings (i.e., value relevance of earnings) differs across countries.1 Those
studies imply two explanations for international differences in the returns-earnings
association. The first implication is that earnings quality (i.e., the quality of earnings in
reflecting information about future benefits) varies across countries, thus resulting in
differences in the value relevance of earnings. The second is that the ability of stock
prices to impound information also differs internationally. Accounting earnings are a
subset of this information, and hence the ability of stock prices to impound accounting
earnings may also differ internationally, even when we control for the quality of earnings.
Consistent with the first argument, Leuz et al. (2003) and Wysocki (2005) find
that earnings quality is higher in countries with higher investor rights’ protection,
suggesting that the returns-earnings association should be higher in those countries as
well. However, the second issue has not been widely addressed in the accounting
literature, but this issue is salient as accounting researchers generally assume that stock
prices are equally informative across countries when they investigate the returns-earnings
association on an international basis (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski 2006). Recently, a
short-window study by DeFond et al. (2007) documents that the information content of
1

See, e.g., Alford et al. (1993); Ali and Hwang (2000); Ball et al. (2000); Hung (2001); Fan and
Wong (2002); Land and Lang (2002); Ball et al. (2003); Bushman and Piotroski (2006).
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earnings announcements is greater in countries with higher earnings quality and stronger
investor protection. Our study complements theirs by measuring earnings quality at the
firm level (they use a country-level measure of earnings quality), having a different
orientation to issues of investor protection (property rights protection, rather than insider
trading prohibitions), and providing evidence that the price formation process is affected
by investor protection where earnings quality is controlled for. That is, we are interested
in the interaction between earnings quality and investor protection, where the returnsearnings association is the dependent variable.
Several recent finance studies show that market-wide variability in returns
explains different proportions of firm-wide total variability, and this variability seems to
be related to country-wide institutional features associated with investor protection
(Morck et al. 2000; Bris et al. 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2005). Using this research as
a basis, this study examines whether accounting information is impounded into stock
prices differently across countries.
Classical valuation theory shows that stock price equals the present value of
expected future cash flows (Miller and Modigliani 1961). Consistent with the theory,
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) document that the returns-earnings association depends on
earnings persistence, which in turn measures the extent to which current earnings are
related to future earnings. Their findings suggest that the returns-earnings association is
associated with the quality of earnings, i.e., the ability of earnings to reflect information
about future benefits accruing to shareholders. In this paper, we use two traditional
earnings quality measures: earnings persistence and the relationship between earnings and
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future cash flows from operations (hereafter described as the earnings-future cash flows
relation, Wysocki (2005)).
On the other hand, the returns-earnings association also depends on how stock
prices reflect future cash flows. If stock prices poorly incorporate the information about
future benefits, the returns-earnings association would be weaker even if earnings reflect
future benefits. Thus, the returns-earnings association is related not only to the quality of
earnings but also to the quality of stock prices, i.e., the ability of stock prices to
incorporate the information about future benefits. Where stock prices are able to reflect
future benefits, the relation between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality
would be more positive. Hence, the strength of the relation between the returns-earnings
association and earnings quality depends on the ability of prices to reflect that quality, and
this in turn depends on the level of protection given to investors to trade on that (earnings)
information. That is, different countries may reflect the same levels of earnings quality
but they will not necessarily reflect similar value relevance metrics if investor protection
differs across those countries.
Building on recent international finance studies, we contend that stock prices’
ability to impound accounting information is related to a country’s institutional
infrastructure. In particular, we are interested in the protection of investor rights and the
nature of the information environment. Using time-series data for firms in 13 countries
from Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial file over the period 1993-2003, we find
that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings quality
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for countries with high anti-director rights2 or strong legal enforcement than for countries
with low anti-director rights or weak legal enforcement. Likewise, we find that the
returns-earnings association is more positively associated with our measures of earnings
quality when a country’s financial disclosure system is timely or when more analysts
follow a stock in that country. Our findings suggest that higher earnings quality
information has a stronger association with value relevance when investor protection is
higher and where information opaqueness is lower. Within-country analyses corroborate
our cross-country results. We also document that the association between stock returns
and earnings quality is higher in the United States than in other countries. Overall, our
findings are consistent with the notion that the returns-earnings association reflects not
only the quality of earnings but also the quality of stock prices.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, our study
extends a line of research on the value relevance of earnings across countries.
Prior research implies two explanations for the international difference in the returnsearnings association: (1) that earnings quality is different across countries, and (2) that the
ability of stock prices to impound accounting information is different across countries.
The findings of several studies are consistent with the first explanation (e.g., Leuz et al.
2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Wysocki 2005; DeFond et al. 2007). However, we
provide evidence on the second issue and investigate whether stock prices impound
earnings differently across countries even if the quality of earnings is controlled for.
Furthermore, unlike recent studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; DeFond et al. 2007), we

2

We use the shareholder protection index from La Porta et al. (1998).
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measure earnings quality at the firm level rather than the country level. In these ways,
our study complements the existing international earnings quality literature. Our results
have implications for international harmonization. They illustrate that adopting common
accounting standards (which may lead to similar measures of earnings quality) will not be
adequate to ensure that the same information is represented in share prices.
Second, the study adds to a growing literature on international differences in the
information content of stock prices. Prior research finds that stock prices impound firmspecific information differently across countries because of differences in investor rights
protection, the openness of capital markets, and information environment opaqueness
(e.g., Morck et al. 2000; Li et al. 2004; Jin and Myers 2006). These studies do not
examine whether stock prices impound accounting information (like earnings) in the same
way in different countries. Chan and Hameed (2006) do examine this issue, but in the
context of emerging markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Their study focuses on the
role of analysts in emerging markets, and it includes an analysis of the impact of earnings
forecasts on returns on portfolios, with the portfolios conditioned on whether analyst
following is high or low. In contrast to prior research, we use the association between the
returns-earnings association metric and earnings quality to measure how well stock prices
can capitalize the fundamentals reflected in earnings. We provide evidence on how the
returns-earnings association can vary with country-level institutional factors. In our
approach, we acknowledge the primacy of investor protection, which can affect both the
quality of earnings and the quality of prices through its impact on how and whether
informed traders trade.

5

Third, this study also adds to the stream of international accounting studies in
terms of methodology. Prior research usually conducts cross-sectional or country-level
analyses ignoring the issue of innate factors (Francis et al. 2005). Innate factors are
particularly important in an international context because the make-up of firms within a
national economy is likely to differ widely between countries. If these fundamental
differences are not controlled for, omitted variables are likely to be a serious issue. We
control for five innate factors identified by Francis et al. (2005) in conducting our firmlevel tests across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research.
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. We describe the sample and research design in
Section 4. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 conducts additional
analysis. Section 7 concludes.

2

Literature Review

2.1

Value relevance of earnings across countries

Alford et al. (1993) find that the information content of earnings is different across
seventeen countries. Earnings are more informative in Australia, France, the Netherlands,
and the UK than in the US, whereas Denmark, Germany, Italy, Singapore, and Sweden
have less informative earnings than the US. However, the results for the other eight
countries are inconclusive.3 They argue that the difference in value relevance of earnings
is due to the capital market differences including the financial reporting requirements,
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The other eight countries are Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Norway, South Africa,
and Switzerland.
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disclosure practices, government regulation, and corporate governance. Ali and Huang
(2000) investigate the relation between country-specific factors and value relevance.
They find that value relevance is lower for countries with bank-oriented financial systems
because of lower demand for value-relevant financial reports, and is lower in countries
where private-sector bodies are not involved in the standard setting process because the
intentions of government standard setters are likely to be politically motivated. They also
find that value relevance is lower for continental model countries, for countries where tax
rules significantly influence financial accounting measurements, and for countries where
less is spent on external auditing services.
Ball et al. (2000) find that earnings are more timely in common law countries than
in code law countries. Their findings are consistent with the notion that common law
countries have a higher demand for timely public disclosure to mitigate information
asymmetry that is more severe in common law countries. Hung (2001) finds that the
value relevance of earnings is higher for countries with accounting systems that use
accruals more extensively and countries with strong protection of investor rights,
suggesting that strong investor rights protection can enhance the benefits of accrual
accounting by constraining opportunism.
Fan and Wong (2002) document that the value relevance of earnings is negatively
associated with ownership concentration in seven East Asian countries.4 They provide
two complementary explanations for their findings. First, the entrenchment effect of
ownership concentration reduces the credibility of reported earnings and consequently
4

The seven countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and
Thailand.
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reduces their information content. Second, high ownership concentration also hinders
information flows to the public resulting in low earnings informativeness. Ball et al.
(2003) find that the four East Asian common law countries – Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand – have less timely earnings than other common law countries
suggesting that poor incentives of managers and auditors reduce the quality of earnings
even though the four countries have (so-called) high quality accounting standards.
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find that accounting conservatism across countries is
affected by legal and political institutions.
DeFond et al. (2007) adopt a short-window approach, and examine the reaction of
share prices (measured by a scaled squared residual) of firms across different countries,
where the primary experimental variables are country-level measures of earnings quality
and investor protection. They find that earnings announcements are more informative
when countries have higher earnings quality and stronger investor protection. The
investor protection metric uses insider trading provisions, arguing that strong provisions
will lead to an increased earnings announcement effect.
In summary, prior studies find that the value relevance of earnings is different
across countries. Those studies imply two explanations for the international differences
in value relevance. First, the lower value relevance of earnings may be related to the
lower quality of earnings in some countries. Second, the lower value relevance of
earnings may be related to the lower ability of stock prices to impound accounting
information in some countries even if the accounting quality is high. Findings in several
studies are consistent with the first explanation. For example, Leuz et al. (2003) and
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Wysocki (2005) find that earnings quality is lower in countries with lower investor rights
protection, where earnings value relevance could be lower. Bhattacharya et al. (2003)
find that earnings opacity is associated with two characteristics of a country’s equity
market – the return that the shareholders demand and how much they trade – implying
that earnings quality could affect the value relevance of earnings.
In contrast to those studies, our study attempts to provide more explicit evidence
on the second explanation, i.e., we examine whether the value relevance of earnings is
associated with the ability of stock prices to impound (accounting) information across
countries. This study complements DeFond et al. (2007) in the following ways. First, we
use firm-level earnings quality metrics whereas DeFond et al. (2007) use a country-level
measure of earnings quality. Second, we provide long-window evidence in contrast to
their use of short (two-day) windows. Third, conceptually, our tests have a different
orientation than theirs. DeFond et al. (2007) argue that weak insider trading legislation
will lead to a smaller share price reaction around the earnings announcement as it is more
likely that the information will have been the basis for trades before the information is
released. Our orientation is that in weak investor protection environments, it is less likely
that the information will be the basis for trading as investors’ property rights are less well
protected.

2.2

Information content of stock prices across countries

Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices in low-income countries impound firm-specific
fundamentals less fully than in high-income countries. Furthermore, they document
evidence that stock price synchronicity is negatively associated with the protection of
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investor rights.5 They conclude that higher protection of investor rights in developed
economies promotes informed trading, resulting in more informative stock prices. Where
property rights are weak, informed trading is less and this reduces the probability that
firm-specific information, including accounting information, will be impounded into
share prices. Wurgler (2000) suggests that lower stock price synchronicity in large
capital markets could be due to more effective arbitrage facilitated by liquidity and low
transaction costs. Bris et al. (2003) find that stock prices incorporate information faster in
countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. Li et al. (2004) document evidence
that firm-specific information is impounded more fully into stock prices in emerging
markets with higher capital market openness than in emerging markets with lower capital
market openness.6 Furthermore, the negative association between stock price
synchronicity and capital market openness is magnified by country-level institutions.
They find that firm-specific stock return variation is significantly related to the interaction
term of capital market openness and a good government index.
Jin and Myers (2006) develop a theoretical model to explain why stock prices
impound firm-specific information less fully in countries with less developed financial
systems and poorer corporate governance. They show that information opaqueness (i.e.,
lack of transparency) reduces the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside

5

They use the R-square from the market model as a measure of stock price synchronicity, and use
alternative proxies for the protection of investor rights: (1) a good government index based on the sum of
three country indexes: (i) corruption index, (ii) risk of expropriation index, (iii) repudiation of contracts by
government index; (2) rule of law index; (3) judicial efficiency index; and (4) the origin of legal systems, all
from La Porta et al. (1998).
6
They use the capital market openness measure provided by Edison and Warnock (2002).
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investors, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity.7 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005)
extend that literature by developing an alternative measure of firm-specific information
based on the percentage of zero return weeks. They find that their zero-return metric is
better than the R-square from asset pricing regressions as a measure of the firm-specific
information impounded in stock prices internationally. Chan and Hameed (2006)
examine stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in 25 emerging markets. They
find that securities that are covered by more analysts have higher synchronicity,
suggesting that the role of analysts is to determine how a company covaries with the
market, rather than what is “special” about that company. Their countries would
generally be classified as those where investor protection is low.
Overall, prior research finds that stock prices are more informative in countries
with higher protection of investor rights, higher openness of capital markets, and less
opaque information environments. However, those studies do not explore how stock
prices impound accounting information across countries. Our study attempts to
complement this line of research by incorporating earnings quality.

3

Hypothesis Development

3.1

Investor rights protection

When countries have lower protection of investor rights, governments and politicians can
make use of various tactics such as changing legislation, licensing requirements,

7

They use five opaqueness measures: (1) a survey-based measure from the Global Competitiveness
Report, (2) a measure of auditing activity from Bhattacharya et al. (2003), (3) a measure of how many key
accounting variables are included in financial statements from La Porta et al. (1998), (4) an opaqueness
measure from PricewaterhouseCoopers, and (5) an opaqueness measure based on the diversity of analysts’
forecasts.
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repudiation of commitments, and nationalization to divert wealth to an entrenched elite
(Morck et al. 2000). In such countries, political events or rumors could lead to larger
market-wide stock price swings, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity. Lower
protection of investor rights discourages informed risk arbitrage because government
interventions and political uncertainty may reduce the benefits of seeking fundamental
information and trading on that. Finance theory shows that informed trading increases in
the attractiveness of risk arbitrage (e.g., Grossman 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In
other words, firm-specific information is less useful to arbitrageurs if protection of
investor rights is poor, and that decreases the number of informed traders relative to noise
traders.
Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices impound less firm-specific information in
countries with lower protection of investor rights. In those countries, stock prices may
not fully impound information about future benefits of the firm. If stock prices do
impound information about a firm’s fundamentals, the association of stock prices with
earnings would be positively related to the quality of earnings because high quality
earnings better reflect the firm’s future benefits. Thus, the association between the
returns-earnings association and earnings quality gauges the ability of stock prices to
capture the information about future benefits as reflected in accounting earnings. For
countries with lower investor rights protection, stock prices may have less ability to
impound accounting information even if the quality of that information is high. Hence,
the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality would be
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less positive when countries have low investor rights protection. We develop the first
hypothesis as follows:
H1

The returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings

quality as investor rights across countries increases.

3.2

Information environment opaqueness

Jin and Myers (2006) theoretically show that less developed financial systems and poorer
corporate governance reduce the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside
investors, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity. They document evidence that
stock prices impound less firm-specific information in countries with high information
opaqueness. The more opaque the information environment, the greater the amount of
bad news that insiders hide. The credibility of all information, including accounting
information, is lower in an information environment that lacks transparency. If the
information environment is highly transparent, better information would flow to the
public. Analysts are more effective intermediaries – i.e., they are better able to interpret
accounting information – when the information environment is less opaque (Lang and
Lundholm 1996).
As stock prices impound more firm-specific information in countries with lower
opaqueness, information about future benefits will be better reflected in stock prices. In
those countries, stock prices are more likely to reflect the same information set as
earnings do when earnings quality is high. When countries have highly opaque
information environments, stock prices do not reflect information about future benefits as
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well, resulting in a lower returns-earnings association even if earnings quality is high.
Thus, the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality would
be less positive in countries with more opaque information environments. We formulate
the second hypothesis as follows:
H2

The returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings

quality for countries with lower information opaqueness.

4

Research Design

4.1

Data

We select all firm-year observations from the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial
file over the period 1993 to 2003. Then, we identify firms that have a time-series of data
of at least seven years so we can calculate a firm-specific measure of earnings quality.
We also use the stock price data from the Compustat Global Issue file. After excluding
observations for countries with less than 30 firms, Table 1 presents the numbers and
frequencies of firms in our sample across 13 countries. 4,238 firms come from thirteen
countries with at least 30 firms in our sample (number of firms in parentheses): Australia
(105), Canada (224), Germany (64), Denmark (31), France (82), United Kingdom (463),
Hong Kong (95), Japan (967), Malaysia (166), Netherlands (43), Singapore (102),
Thailand (82), and United States (1,814).
Insert Table 1 about here

4.2

Variables

14

We measure the firm-specific returns-earnings association by estimating the following
firm-specific regression and using the coefficient on the earnings change as a measure of
the contemporaneous relation between stock returns and accounting earnings:
(1)

RETj,t = β0,j + β1,j ∆EARNj,t + εj,t
where
RETj,t = firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal
year t;

∆EARNj,t = change in firm j’s income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled
by market value at the end of year t-1.
We label the coefficient for returns-earnings association β1,j as REA. Similar to Tucker
and Zarowin (2006), we use the fractional ranking of REA within each country in the
analysis to control for country fixed effects.8 We use a long window in measuring the
returns-earnings association because accounting information can be publicly released
through earnings announcements, but can also be disseminated, interpreted, and processed
through other information sources including analyst reports and media coverage. Thus,
the emphasis is on the association between stock returns and the change in accounting
earnings over a long window rather than the response to unexpected earnings over a short
window (i.e., the earnings response coefficient).
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we use the anti-director rights score from La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1998) as our first measure of investor rights’ protection
(INVRA), and use the average score of three legal enforcement scores in La Porta et al.
8

The fractional ranking for a firm is the raw rank of the firm divided by the total number of firms
within a country to which the firm belongs.
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(1998): (1) efficiency of the judicial system, (2) rule of law, and (3) corruption, as the
second measure of investor rights’ protection (INVRL). In terms of measuring
information opaqueness, we use a Centre for International Financial Analysis and
Research (CIFAR) based score on timeliness of financial disclosure from Bushman et al.
(2004) as a first measure (INFOPT). We use this CIFAR based score on timeliness of
financial disclosure because Jin and Myers (2006) argue that information opaqueness
could be related to the delay of bad news disclosure by companies. We also use the
number of analysts across countries from Chang et al. (2000) as a second measure of
information opaqueness (INFOPA). Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analyst
following is related to the information environment so we use analyst coverage in a
country as a proxy for its information opaqueness.
Table 2 summarizes the scores of investor rights protection measures and
information opaqueness measures across the 13 countries.
Insert Table 2 about here
To measure earnings quality, we run the first order auto-regression of earnings:
(2)

Ej,t = ρ0,j + ρ1,j Ej,t-1 + υj,t
where

Ej,t = firm j’s split-adjusted EPS, income before extraordinary items in year
t, divided by average number of outstanding shares between the
beginning and end of year t.
Based on Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Francis et al. (2004), we use the coefficient ρ1,j
in eq. (2), earnings persistence, as the first measure of earnings quality: QPER. This
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coefficient measures the ability of current earnings to reflect information about future
earnings. We use the fractional ranking of QPER within each country in the analysis.
Prior research documents a relationship between earnings and future cash flows
(e.g., Bowen et al. 1996; Barth et al. 2001). We therefore also run the following
regression:
(3)

CFO j,t = δ0,j + δ1,j Ej,t-1 + ζj,t
where
CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flows from operations in year t, divided by average

number of outstanding shares between the beginning and end of year t.
We use the coefficient δ1,j in eq. (3), the earnings-future cash flows relation, as the second
measure of earnings quality: QCFO. This coefficient measures the ability of earnings to
reflect information about future cash flows from operations. We also use the fractional
ranking of QCFO within each country in the analysis.9
Finally, we use the five innate factors in Francis et al. (2004) as control variables.
These variables are firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, operating cycle, and
incidence of negative earnings realizations. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the log of
total assets ($m). Cash flow variability (CFOV) is the standard deviation of the firm’s
time-series cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets. Sales variability (SALEV)
is the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series sales revenues, scaled by total assets.
Operating cycle (OPCYC) is calculated as the log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts

9

We use at least 7 years of time-series data to run regression (1), (2) and (3) for each firm.
Following Ball et al. (2000), the top and bottom percentiles of each variable in these equations are
excluded.
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receivable and days inventory. Incidence of negative earnings realizations (NEGE) is the
firm’s proportion of losses over the time-series period.

4.3

Models

We use the following cross-sectional model to test H1:
REAj = µ0 + µ1 INVRj + µ2 QE j + µ3 INVR j *QE j + µ4 SIZE j + µ5 CFOV j
+ µ6 SALEVj + µ7 OPCYC j + µ8 NEGEj + µ9 INFOPj + ωj

(4)

where
INVRj = measures of investor rights protection for a country to which firm j
belongs, either anti-director rights (INVRA) or legal enforcement
(INVRL);
QEj = measures of earnings quality of firm j in year t, either earnings
persistence (QPER) or earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO);
INFOPj = measures of information opaqueness for a country to which firm j belongs,
either timeliness of financial disclosure (INFOPT) or analyst coverage
(INFOPA) is used.
Support for H1 exists if µ3 is positive and significantly different from zero. The sign of µ1
depends on not only the relationship between the returns-earnings association and
investor rights protection but also the level of earnings quality. Similarly, the sign of µ2
depends on not only the relationship between the returns-earnings association and
earnings quality but also the level of investor rights protection. Thus, we do not predict
signs for either of µ1 and µ2. Based on Francis et al. (2004), the predicted signs of the
coefficients on the five innate control variables are as follows: µ4 <0, µ5 >0, µ6 >0, µ7 <0,
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and µ8 <0.10 Further, we control for information opaqueness in testing H1, but we do not
predict a sign for µ9.11
We test H2 by running the following cross-sectional model:
REAj = π0 +π1 INFOPj + π2 QE j + π3 INFOP j *QE j +π4 SIZE j + π5 CFOVj
+π6 SALEVj + π7 OPCYC j +π 8 NEGEj + π 9 INVRj +ψj .

(5)

If H2 is supported, π3 will be significantly different from zero and positive. Similar to eq.
(4), the predicted signs of other coefficients in eq. (5) are as follows: no predicted signs
for π1 and π2, π4 <0, π5 >0, π6 >0, π7 <0, and π8 <0. As in H1, we control for investor
protection in testing H2, but we do not predict a sign for π9.

5

Empirical Results

The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3. By using the fractional
ranking scores, the mean and median of the returns-earnings association (REA), earnings
persistence (QPER), and the earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) are all 0.50.
Table 4 presents Pearson correlations between independent variables. After measuring
earnings quality by the fractional ranking, both investor rights protection and information
opaqueness are not correlated with earnings quality measures. The correlation
coefficients are 0.52, 0.59, 0.44, 0.44, 0.41, and 0.44 for each pair of country-level
factors: anti-director rights and legal enforcement, anti-director rights and timeliness of
financial disclosure, anti-director rights and analyst coverage, legal enforcement and
timeliness of financial disclosure, legal enforcement and analyst coverage, and timeliness
10

The control variables in the regressions are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent.
We do not test H1 and H2 together because the interaction terms, i.e., INVR*QE and INFOP*QE,
are highly correlated (r = 0.875 - 0.979).
11
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of financial disclosure and analyst coverage, respectively, showing that the four countrylevel variables are correlated.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
We conduct a preliminary within-country analysis for each of the 13 countries in
the sample. We run the following regression for each country:
REAj = λ0 + λ1 QE j +λ2 SIZE j +λ3 CFOV j+λ4 SALEVj + λ5 OPCYC j
+λ6 NEGEj +θj .

(6)

The coefficient λ1 measures the country-level association between the returns-earnings
association and earnings quality. We compute the composite score of investor protection
and information opaqueness as the factor score based on the first factor from a factor
analysis of anti-director rights, legal enforcement, timeliness of financial disclosure, and
analyst coverage. Table 5 provides the composite scores, standardized coefficients λ1,
their corresponding t-statistics, and p-values for each country.
Insert Table 5 about here
To see if the pattern in Table 5 corresponds with our hypotheses, we calculate the
parametric and nonparametric correlations between our composite score and the
standardised coefficients λ1 or their corresponding t-statistics. We find that Pearson
correlation coefficients for the correlation between the composite score and λ1QPER and
λ1QCFO are 0.891 and 0.810, respectively, and these correlations are significant at the 1%
level. Further, the Pearson coefficients for the correlations between the composite score
and t-statistics for λ1QPER and λ1QCFO are 0.692 and 0.676, respectively, and these are
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. We find similar results using the
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Spearman correlations. These correlations show that our overall investor rights protection
and information opaqueness scores are significantly positively correlated with the
country-level metrics which capture the association between earnings quality and value
relevance. Thus, our within-country analyses support our hypotheses.
Next, we conduct cross-country tests by pooling data from all 13 countries. Table
6 presents evidence on testing whether the association between the returns-earnings
association and earnings quality is related to a country’s investor rights protection where
we control for INFOPT. Untabulated results where we control for INFOPA are
qualitatively the same. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report the results on the effect of antidirector rights (INVRA) on the relation between the returns-earnings association and
earnings persistence (QPER). The coefficient on the interaction term (INVRA*QPER) is
0.052 and is statistically significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 2.98, p-value <
0.01), consistent with H1. The results show that the returns-earnings association is more
positively associated with earnings persistence as anti-director rights increase, which we
interpret as higher investor protection. Consistent with findings by Francis et al. (2004),
we also find that two innate variables, firm size (SIZE) and incidence of negative earnings
realization (NEGE) are negatively associated with the returns-earnings association. In
addition, we find that cash flow variability (CFOV) and operating cycle (OPCYC) are
negatively and positively associated with the returns-earnings association, respectively.
Insert Table 6 about here
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present evidence on whether legal enforcement
(INVRL) affects the relation between the returns-earnings association and earnings
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persistence. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term (INVRL*QPER) is 0.044
and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 2.22, p-value < 0.05), supporting H1.
The results show that the returns-earnings association is more positively related to
earnings persistence as legal enforcement increases across countries.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 report the results on the effect of anti-director rights
on the association between the returns-earnings association and the earnings-future cash
flows relation (QCFO). The coefficient on the interaction term (INVRA*QCFO) is 0.075
and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 4.20; p-value < 0.01), consistent with
H1. The results show that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated
with the earnings-future cash flows relation when a country has higher anti-director
rights. Columns 9 and 10 of Table 6 document evidence on testing whether legal
enforcement affects the association between the returns-earnings association and the
earnings-future cash flows relation. The coefficient on the interaction term
(INVRL*QCFO) is 0.014 and is not significant (t-statistic = 0.63), inconsistent with H1.
Overall, the results in Table 6 support H1 that the association between the returnsearnings association and earnings quality increases as investor protection increases across
countries. That is, the value relevance of earnings depends on the quality of earnings, and
the ability of prices to reflect that quality.
Table 7 provides evidence on examining whether the association between the
returns-earnings association and earnings quality is associated with the information
environment of a country where we control for INVRA. Untabulated results where we
control for INVRL are qualitatively the same. The results on the effect of timeliness of
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financial disclosure (INFOPT) on the relation between the returns-earnings association
and earnings persistence are reported in Columns 3 and 4. We find that the coefficient on
the interaction term (INFOPT*QPER) is 0.008 and significantly different from zero (tstatistic=5.20, p-value<0.01), consistent with H2. The results show that the returnsearnings association is more positively associated with earnings persistence when
timeliness of financial disclosure is high. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 present the
evidence on whether analyst coverage (INFOPA) affects the relation between the returnsearnings association and earnings persistence. The coefficient on the interaction term
(INFOPA*QPER) is 0.001 and is not significant (t-statistic = 0.26), inconsistent with H2.
Insert Table 7 about here
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7 present evidence on the effect of timeliness of
financial disclosure on the association between the returns-earnings relation and the
earnings-future cash flows relation. The coefficient on the interaction term
(INFOPT*QCFO) is 0.008 and significant (t-statistic = 5.10; p-value < 0.01), consistent
with H2. Columns 9 and 10 provide the results from testing whether analyst coverage
affects the association between the returns-earnings and the earnings-future cash flows
relation. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term (INFOPA*QCFO) is 0.004
and significant (t-statistic = 1.95; p-value < 0.05), consistent with H2. Overall, the results
in Table 7 are consistent with H2 that the association between the returns-earnings
association and earnings quality is more positive for countries with information
environments that have low opaqueness than for countries with information environments
with high opaqueness. The returns-earnings association depends on both earnings quality
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and the information environment. The same quality of earnings will reflect different
value relevance if the information environment is different.

6

Additional Analyses

We conduct several additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results.
First, earnings quality is not an exogenous variable, and our measures of earnings quality
may be affected by the informativeness of earnings, i.e., the returns-earnings association.
For example, when REA is high, managers have more incentive to pay attention to the
quality of earnings. To control for this endogenous relationship, we follow a procedure
used by Frankel et al. (2006), and we model QE as a function of the exogenous control
variables and QERANK which is the portfolio rank of firm j’s QE:
QEj = α0 + α1SIZEj + α2CFOVj + α3SALEVj + α4OPCYCj + α5NEGEj +

α6QERANKj + εj

(7)

To create QERANK, we rank firms by QE and then divide them into three equal-sized
portfolios. Firms in the lowest (highest) portfolio are coded 0 (2). Once we estimate eq.
(7), we use the fitted value for QE in place of the actual value in eqs. (4) and (5).
The rationale for including QERANK is that endogeneity is likely to affect the
variation in QE rather than the level of QE (e.g., Greene 2000). Thus, as Hentschel and
Kothari (2001) explain, a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be
used as an instrumental variable since it is likely to capture the level of that variable but
not the endogenously determined variations around those levels.
Table 8 summarizes the results from re-estimating eqs.(4) and (5) using the fitted
values of QE. For brevity, we only report the coefficients for the interaction between the
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fitted values and our measures of investor protection and information opaqueness. There
are eight interaction terms, and six are significant and correctly signed. Only
INVRLj*FQCFOj and INFOPAj*FQPERj are not significant, and the corresponding
coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 (i.e., INVRLj*QCFOj and INFOPAj*QPERj) are also not
significant. Thus, after controlling for endogeneity in QE, the results in Table 8 are
consistent with our earlier findings.
Insert Table 8 about here
Second, we re-estimate eqs. (4) and (5) by converting one of INVRj, INFOPj,
QCFOj, and QPERj into a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if its value is at or
above the median and 0 otherwise. We find a more positive relationship for the returnsearnings association with earnings persistence for firms in countries with high antidirector rights, legal enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated tstatistics = 2.43, 3.21, and 4.91, respectively) when the country-level dummy variables
are used. In turn, to measure earnings quality by the earnings-future cash flows relation,
we find significant evidence for each country-level dummy variable (non-tabulated tstatistics = 4.53, 4.29, 4.56, and 1.41, respectively). When earnings persistence is
converted into a dummy, we document significant evidence for anti-director rights, legal
enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 3.13, 2.73,
and 5.58, respectively). Also, we find that anti-director rights, timeliness of financial
disclosure, and analyst coverage affect the association between the returns-earnings
relation and the dummy of the earnings-future cash flows relation (non-tabulated tstatistics = 3.76, 3.89, and 2.28, respectively). Overall, our earlier results still hold when
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we measure investor protection, information opaqueness, or earnings quality using a
dummy variable.
Third, we test the hypotheses at the firm level based on the composite score of
investor protection and information opaqueness in Table 5. Likewise, we find that the
returns-earnings association is more positively associated with the earnings persistence
and the earnings-future cash flows relation for firms in countries with high composite
scores of investor protection and information opaqueness (non-tabulated t-statistics = 5.27
and 4.61, respectively).
Fourth, we examine whether the results are driven by the dominance of the number
of the US firms and Japanese firms in our sample. After excluding the US firms from the
sample, we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with
earnings persistence for firms in countries with high anti-director rights, legal
enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 1.81, 1.37,
4.69, respectively). After excluding the US and Japanese firms together from the sample,
we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings
persistence for firms in countries with high anti-director rights and timeliness of financial
disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 1.95 and 3.79, respectively). After excluding the
US firms or the US and Japanese firms together from the sample, we also document that
the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with the earnings-future
cash flows relation for firms in countries with high anti-director rights and timeliness of
financial disclosure. In summary, we still find support for our hypotheses when US, or
US and Japanese firms are omitted.
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Fifth, we examine whether the association between the returns-earnings
association and earnings quality is more positive in the US than in non-US countries
because it is usually recognized that the US has higher investor rights protection and
lower opaqueness of the information environment than other countries. We use a US
dummy variable that takes a value of one for US companies and zero otherwise, and run
regressions of the returns-earnings association on the interaction term of the US dummy
variable and earnings quality after controlling for the innate factors. We find that the
coefficients on the interaction term of the US dummy variable and earnings persistence,
and the earnings-future cash flows relationship, are significantly positive (non-tabulated tstatistics = 2.51 and 3.61, respectively). Our findings suggest that US stock prices
impound accounting information more precisely than non-US stock prices.
Finally, we test if the results are robust to the requirements on the length of years
for data availability. We increase the minimum number of years from at least 7 years to
at least 8 or at least 9 years. While this gives us more time-series data to estimate eqs.
(1)-(3), it also reduces our sample size. We find similar results, that the returns-earnings
association is more positively associated with earnings quality when a country has high
investor rights protection or low information opaqueness when we use a minimum of 8 or
9 years of data.

7

Conclusion

This study examines whether the association between the returns-earnings association and
earnings quality is related to investor rights protection and the information environment in
an international setting. We find that the returns-earnings association is more positively
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associated with earnings persistence and the earnings-future cash flows relation when a
country has high investor rights protection, measured by anti-director rights and legal
enforcement. Also, we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively
associated with earnings persistence and with the earnings-future cash flows relation
when a country has low information opaqueness, measured by timeliness of financial
disclosure and analyst coverage. Our findings suggest that the extent of investor
protection moderates the association between the returns-earnings relationship and
earnings quality. In other words, price reactions depend on earnings quality and the
ability of investors to be able to trade on that information. Effectively the quality of
prices and the quality of earnings both affect the value relevance of earnings. Thus, this
study implies that the role of accounting in capital markets depends on the institutional
infrastructure of the capital markets. Even if the accounting system can generate high
quality accounting information in a country with a weak institutional infrastructure, the
information is still less important to capital market participants in that country. This has
important implications for policy makers who emphasize the importance of international
accounting standards harmonization. Without improvements in investor protection, any
(arguable) gains from improved earnings quality will not be fully realized.
Similar to other studies, this study has its own limitations. First, doing firmspecific analysis requires time-series data, and this can lead to a survivorship bias.
Second, we use the timeliness of financial disclosure and analyst coverage as proxies for
opaqueness of information environment. However, there are no well-established
paradigms that support these two measures as being the most appropriate. The
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appropriateness of using these one-dimensional measures depends on how well they can
represent the comprehensive features of the information environment. Future research
might investigate alternative proxies for country-level information opaqueness.
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Table 1
Sample firms across countries
This table presents frequency and percent of firms with at least 7 years of data available
in Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial between 1993-2003 for 13 sample countries.
Country Name
AUSTRALIA

AUS

Frequency
105

CANADA

CAN

224

5.29

GERMANY

DEU

64

1.51

DENMARK

DNK

31

0.73

FRANCE

FRA

82

1.93

UNITED KINGDOM

GBR

463

10.92

HKG

95

2.24

JPN

967

22.82

MALAYSIA

MYS

166

3.92

NETHERLANDS

NLD

43

1.01

SINGAPORE

SGP

102

2.41

THAILAND

THA

82

1.93

UNITED STATES

USA

1,814

42.80

4,238

100.00

HONG KONG
JAPAN

Country Code

Total

32

Percent (%)
2.48

Table 2
Scores of investor rights protection and information opaqueness across countries
This table presents country scores of investor rights protection, measured by: (1) anti-director rights
(INVRA ) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); (2) legal enforcement (INVRL )
which is the average of three legal enforcement scores, i.e., (a) efficiency of judicial system, (b) rule of law,
(c) corruption, from La Porta, Lopez- de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and country scores of
information opaqueness, measured by (1) timeliness of financial disclosure (INFOPT), a CIFAR based
score from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004); (2) analyst coverage (INFOPA), from Chang, Khanna,
and Palepu (2000). Higher scores indicate higher protection of investor rights and lower opaqueness of
information environment.
Anti-director

Legal

Timeliness of

Analyst

Rights

Enforcement

Financial Disclosure

Coverage

AUSTRALIA

4

9.51

89.13

12.30

CANADA

5

9.75

99.28

16.90

GERMANY

1

9.05

68.12

32.40

DENMARK

2

10.00

73.91

12.87

FRANCE

3

8.68

78.26

23.20

UNITED KINGDOM

5

9.22

86.96

20.10

HONG KONG

5

8.91

69.57

25.00

Country

JAPAN

4

9.17

86.23

14.87

MALAYSIA

4

7.72

65.22

19.90

NETHERLANDS

2

10.00

78.26

29.53

SINGAPORE

4

8.93

63.77

20.90

THAILAND

2

4.89

89.13

9.77

UNITED STATES

5

9.54

97.83

30.23
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics about the following variables:
REA
= fractional ranking of the returns-earnings association coefficient within a country where the
returns-earnings association coefficient is estimated for each firm from the following model,
RETj,t = β0,j + β1,j ∆EARNj,t + εj,t
(1)
SIZE
= Firm size, measured by the log of total assets ($m).
CFOV = Cash flow variability, measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series cash
flows from operations, scaled by total assets.
SALEV = Sales variability, measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series sales
revenues, scaled by total assets.
OPCYC = Operating cycle, measured by the log of the sum of the firm’s days account receivables
and days inventory.
NEGE = Incidence of negative earnings realization, measured by the firm’s proportion of losses
over the time series period.
QPER = Earnings quality, measured by the fractional ranking of earnings persistence within a country,
and earnings persistence is estimated for each firm from the following model,
Ej,t = ρ0,j + ρ1,j Ej,t-1 + υj,t
(2)
QCFO = Earnings quality, measured by the factional ranking of the relation between earnings and
future cash flows from operations within a country. The relation between earnings and future
cash flows from operations is estimated for each firm from the following model,
CFO j,t = δ0,j + δ1,j Ej,t-1 + ζj,t
(3)
Variables
REA
SIZE
CFOV
SALEV
OPCYC
NEGE
QPER
QCFO

N

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Q1

Q3

4,238
4,238
4,238
4,238
4,238
4,238
4,238
4,220

0.50
6.27
0.08
0.19
4.74
0.23
0.50
0.50

0.50
6.21
0.06
0.14
4.80
0.14
0.50
0.50

0.29
1.83
0.07
0.17
0.73
0.27
0.29
0.29

0.25
5.07
0.04
0.08
4.32
0.00
0.25
0.25

0.75
7.48
0.10
0.25
5.19
0.38
0.75
0.75
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Table 4
Pearson correlations
This table presents Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables (N=4,205)

Variables

CFOV

SALEV

SIZE
CFOV
SALEV
OPCYC
NEGE
QPER
QCFO
INVRA
INVRL
INFOPT

-0.38***

-0.14***
0.36***

OPCYC
-0.16***
0.11***
-0.15***

NEGE

QPER

QCFO

-0.36***
0.41***
0.07***
0.14***

0.03**
-0.08***
0.01
-0.02
-0.10***

0.06***
-0.08***
-0.01
-0.07***
-0.15***
0.47***

*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed).
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INVRA
0.03**
0.07***
0.08***
-0.15***
0.03**
0.00
-0.00

INVRL
0.20***
-0.03**
0.06***
-0.13***
-0.02
0.00
-0.00
0.52***

INFOPT
0.13***
0.01
0.09***
-0.22***
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.59***
0.44***

INFOPA
0.12***
0.17***
0.25***
-0.14***
-0.05***
0.00
-0.00
0.44***
0.41***
0.44***

Table 5
Country-level analysis
This table presents the standardized coefficients of regressing the returns-earnings association on earnings
quality for each country (eq. (6)), and their corresponding t-statistics and two-tailed p-values. Composite
score is factor1 score of the factor analysis of anti-director rights, legal enforcement, timeliness of financial
disclosure, and analyst coverage.
REAj = λ0 + λ1 QE j +λ2 SIZE j +λ3 CFOV j+λ4 SALEVj + λ5 OPCYC j +λ6 NEGEj +θj .

Country
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
GERMANY
DENMARK
FRANCE
UNITED KINGDOM
HONG KONG
JAPAN
MALAYSIA
NETHERLANDS
SINGAPORE
THAILAND
UNITED STATES

(6)

Composite
Score

λ1QPER

t-statistic

p-value

λ1QCFO

t-statistic

p-value

0.99
1.50
-2.06
-0.40
-0.41
0.78
-0.29
0.73
-0.46
-1.16
-0.64
0.72
0.68

0.200
0.304
-0.161
0.105
0.157
0.160
-0.094
0.173
-0.030
-0.096
0.044
0.175
0.224

2.00
4.76
-1.26
0.52
1.40
3.65
-0.85
5.66
-0.40
-0.54
0.46
1.55
10.01

0.049
0.000
0.212
0.605
0.167
0.000
0.382
0.000
0.691
0.591
0.645
0.126
0.000

0.058
0.132
-0.194
-0.277
-0.099
0.083
-0.037
-0.011
-0.105
-0.258
-0.053
0.225
0.126

0.58
2.01
-1.41
-1.56
-0.84
1.85
-0.37
-0.36
-1.39
-1.43
-0.55
1.96
5.46

0.563
0.046
0.165
0.132
0.402
0.065
0.716
0.718
0.166
0.162
0.582
0.054
0.000
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Table 6
Effects of investor rights protection on the association of earnings quality with the value relevance of earnings
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality is affected by investor rights
protection. Columns 3-4 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association (REA) on earnings persistence (QPER) and the interaction term
of earnings persistence and anti-director rights (INVRA) (Specification (4a)). Columns 5-6 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings
association on earnings persistence and the interaction term of earnings persistence and legal enforcement (INVRL) (Specification (4b)). Columns 7-8
report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on the earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) and the interaction term of the
earnings-future cash flows relation and anti-director rights (Specification (4c)). Columns 9-10 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings
association on earnings-future cash flows relation and the interaction term of earnings-future cash flows relation and legal enforcement (Specification
(4d)).
REAj = µ0+ µ1 INVRj + µ2 QE j + µ3 INVR j *QE j + µ4 SIZE j + µ5 CFOV j + µ6 SALEVj +µ7 OPCYC j + µ8 NEGEj + µ9 INFOPTj +ωj
Specification (4a)

Variables

Predicted
sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

Constant

0.542

7.82***

INVRA

0.029

2.61***

INVRL

Specification (4b)

Coefficient
0.442

0.024

QPER

-0.055

-0.69

-0.231

QCFO
INVRA*QPER

+

INVRA*QCFO

+

0.052

t-statistic
3.80***

Specification (4c)

Coefficient

t-statistic

0.695

10.00***

-0.035

-3.15***

2.02**

Specification (4d)

Coefficient
0.587

t-statistic
4.99***

-0.005

-0.43

-0.072

-0.39

-1.25
-0.275

-3.42***

0.075

4.20***

2.98***
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(4)

Table 6
(continued)
INVRL*QPER

+

INVRL*QCFO

+

SIZE

-

-0.010

-3.89***

-0.010

-3.92***

-0.011

-4.10***

-0.011

-4.08***

CFOV

+

-0.154

-2.07**

-0.156

-2.10**

-0.178

-2.33***

-0.185

-2.42***

SALEV

+

0.024

0.87

0.025

0.88

0.030

1.06

0.031

1.07

OPCYC

-

0.010

1.57*

0.010

1.58*

0.012

2.01**

0.011

1.85**

NEGE

-

-0.263

-14.62***

-0.264

-14.65***

-0.276

-15.05***

-0.276

-15.01***

+/-

0.000

INFOPT
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

0.044

2.22**
0.014

0.15

0.000

4,238
53.08***
9.96%

0.27
4,238
52.60***
9.88%

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed).
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0.000

0.29
4,220
38.36***
7.38%

0.000

0.69

0.45
4,220
36.29***
7.00%

Table 7
Effects of information opaqueness on the association of earnings quality with the value relevance of earnings
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality is affected by information opaqueness.
Columns 3-4 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association (REA) on earnings persistence (QPER) and the interaction term of earnings persistence
and timeliness of financial disclosure (INFOPT) (Specification (5a)). Columns 5-6 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on earnings
persistence and the interaction term of earnings persistence and analyst coverage (INFOPA) (Specification (5b)). Columns 7-8 report the results of regressing the
returns-earnings association on earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) and the interaction term of the earnings-future cash flows relation and timeliness of
financial disclosure (Specification (5c)). Columns 9-10 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on the earnings-future cash flows relation and
the interaction term of the earnings-future cash flows relation and analyst coverage (Specification (5d)).
(5)

REAj = π0 +π1 INFOPj + π2 QE j + π3 INFOP j *QE j +π4 SIZE j +π5 CFOV j+π6 SALEVj + π7 OPCYC j +π 8 NEGEj + +π 9 INVRAj +ψj
Specification (5a)

Variables

Predicted
sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

Constant

0.309

3.51***

INFOPT

0.004

4.30***

INOPA
QPER

-0.508

-3.82***

Specification (5b)

Coefficient
0.662

INFOPT*QPER

+

INFOPT*QCFO

+

0.008

t-statistic

Coefficient

12.86***

0.873

9.89***

-0.004

-3.97***

0.000

0.04

0.166

3.32***

QCFO

Specification (5c)

t-statistic

-0.624

-4.64***

0.008

5.10***

5.20***
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Specification (5d)

Coefficient

t-statistic

0.588

11.23***

-0.002

-1.78**

-0.038

-0.74

Table 7
(continued)
INFOPA*QPER

+

INFOPA*QCFO

+

SIZE

-

-0.010

-3.77***

-0.010

-3.85***

-0.011

CFOV

+

-0.149

-2.01**

-0.151

-2.00**

-0.182

SALEV

+

0.024

0.87

0.026

0.92

0.032

1.13

0.033

1.14

OPCYC

-

0.010

1.65**

0.009

1.53*

0.012

1.91**

0.011

1.84**

NEGE

-

-0.261

-14.57***

-0.265

-14.71***

-0.273

-14.88***

-0.275

-14.91***

INVRA

+/-

0.002

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

0.001

0.34

0.003

4,238
55.33***
10.35%

0.26

0.60
4,238
52.01***
9.78%

***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed).
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0.003

0.004

1.95**

-4.09***

-0.011

-3.97***

-2.38***

-0.184

-2.38***

0.44
4,220
39.35***
7.56%

0.005

0.80
4,220
36.71***
7.08%

Table 8
Effects of investor rights protection and information opaqueness on the association of earnings
quality with the value relevance of earnings using a two stage process
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and
earnings quality is affected by both investor protection (as in Table 5) and information opaqueness (as
in Table 6). The second column provides the estimate on the interactive term (which is defined in the
first column). The third column provides the adjusted R-square from the regression. FQPER (FQCFO)
is the fitted value from the first stage regression where QPER (QCFO) is the dependent variable. The
first regression is where QERANK is 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by QE:
QEj = α0 + α1SIZEj + α2CFOVj + α3SALEVj + α4OPCYCj + α5NEGEj + α6QERANKj + εj

Description of Interaction Terms

INVRAj*FQPERj
INVRLj*FQPERj
INVRAj*FQCFOj
INVRLj*FQCFOj
INFOPTj*FQPERj
INFOPAj*FQPERj
INFOPTj*FQCFOj
INFOPAj*FQCFOj

Coefficient

Adjusted R2 from second stage
regression

0.060***
0.031*
0.075***
0.007
0.008***
0.000
0.007***
0.003*

*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively (one-tailed).
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9.87%
9.70%
7.28%
6.94%
10.18%
9.65%
7.39%
6.98%

(7)

